



EU-China Hub

Monthly Report



OCTOBER 2020

YOUR MONTHLY REVIEW
OF KEY EU-CHINA NEWS



About EU-CHINA HUB

We are a Brussels-based, private, non-profit initiative pushing forward dialogue on EU-China relations.

Given China's rapidly rising importance on the global stage, it is now more important than ever for EU-China relations to be better understood not only by an inner circle of professionals and enthusiasts, but also by politicians, business people, and the general public.

This is especially true as Europe struggles to embrace the complexity of its relationship with China as a partner, a competitor, and a rival.

We aim to break down this complexity in a digestible format by aggregating the key EU-China news stories and interviewing important players directly involved in EU-China relations.

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WELCOME TO THE MONTHLY EU-CHINA REPORT!



OCTOBER 2020
(SEPTEMBER 1 - OCTOBER 5)

September was an intense month in EU-China relations. We got to observe a mildly reassuring EU-China videoconference between EU leaders and Xi Jinping, the further consolidation of EU unity on China during the Special European Council's Summit, increased diplomatic exchanges with China and the US - such as European tours of Wang Yi, Yang Jiechi, Mike Pompeo - and finally the intensification of debate about the EU's Taiwan policy.

The overall outlook seems to be quite negative for China. There is a growing agreement among the member states for a need of a more assertive and united European policy towards China. In this context, it is notable that Germany appears to also be increasingly supportive of such a line as shown by comments from Chancellor Merkel and preparations of new 5G regulations that are unfavorable to Huawei.

Importantly, this assertive stance stems from both "promise fatigue" based to a large extent on the prolonged CAI negotiations and from the growing concern of multiple European actors about issues linked to "systemic rivalry" such as mistreatment of minorities in China or lack of adherence to the rule of law. It is unlikely that China will make considerable moves to address the European concerns on either of the issues, which seems to be locking relations on divergent trajectories, despite the potential boost in engagement over cooperation on climate policies following China's announcement of carbon neutrality goals.

It is then perhaps not surprising that the EU is increasingly clear about the fact that it regards its ties with Washington as much closer than those connecting to Beijing. However, the "Sinatra Doctrine" remains at the core of Brussels' strategic thinking about its global position amid the escalating tensions between the US and China and the EU is adamant about its plans to enhance its own Strategic Autonomy.

We hope that you will enjoy this report and encourage you to share it with your network.

Enjoy and stay safe!

Grzegorz Stec
Founder of EU-China Hub

Hear opinions of EU-China experts and decision-makers



JAKUB JAKÓBOWSKI

*Coordinator of the Connectivity in Eurasia Project
at the Centre for Eastern Studies*



*Geopolitics of Connectivity Competition -
The Curious Case of Central and Eastern Europe*

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SUMMARY

On September 14, the EU and China held their high-level video-conference bringing together Xi, von der Leyen, Merkel, and Michel. It is worth noting that shortly before the conference, the EU and China signed a bilateral agreement on geographical indications (GI) that was negotiated last year.

However aside from it, the summit displayed no major breakthrough, but it did display a show of 'speaking with one voice' unity on the EU side. Chances of a CAI negotiations being finalized by December remain slim and von der Leyen threw the ball in Beijing's court, saying "China has to convince us that it is worth having a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment". Still, according to post-conference briefings, CAI negotiations now enjoy support of the highest political levels in China. The EU leaders also raised questions over abuses against ethnic minorities and protesters in Hong Kong, to which Xi retorted that China is not interested in lessons on human rights pointing out human rights challenges of European countries.

On the bright side, Brussels and Beijing agreed to hold two new high-level dialogues on digital cooperation (which has taken place days before the conference) and on climate cooperation, as well as to soon resume the dialogue on human rights. Notably, the EU27-Xi meeting was also discussed as President Michel invited President Xi to meet with the EU27 leaders in Brussels at some point in 2021.

Also notably, the dialogue on climate may become more constructive, as Xi opened a door for wider cooperation during his United Nations General Assembly speech, when he announced to the surprise of many that China will hit peak emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality in 2060.

FACTS AND FIGURES



No major breakthrough was achieved at the video-conference on significant topics, as progress lacked on the CAI and systemic rivalry on human rights was emphasized.



100 European GI's in China and 100 Chinese GI's in the EU will be protected against imitation under the GI deal.



President Michel invited President Xi Jinping for a summit with EU27 in Brussels in 2021, though the exact date has not yet been set.



2 new high-level dialogues were agreed upon by Brussels and Beijing: on digital cooperation and on climate cooperation



2030 peak emissions and 2060 carbon neutrality goals were proclaimed by Xi Jinping in his UNGA speech

QUOTES



"Europe needs to be a player, not a playing-field."

Charles Michel, EUCO President



"China has to convince us that it is worth having a Comprehensive Agreement of Investment."

Ursula von der Leyen, EC President



"Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of Nature and go down the beaten path of extracting resources without investing in conservation, pursuing development at the expense of protection, and exploiting resources without restoration."

Xi Jinping, PRC President, CCP Secretary General

TAKEAWAY

If the summit did not offer any significant change of pace or approach in EU-China relations, it surely did point out that EU leaders have homogenized their (lack of) patience with Beijing. The so-called "promise fatigue" was particularly evident in Ursula von der Leyen's briefing following the conference.

Despite new accomplishments, the general feeling isn't one of exuberating prospects for cooperation, but rather 'more concrete deliverables are needed on the Chinese side'. In this context, China announcing groundbreaking plans to overhaul its coal-reliant economy was met with curiosity, but also a slight raise of eyebrows in Brussels.

Such relative skepticism and assertiveness can be constructive, if they encourage the Chinese government to outline a proper plan for reaching its new climate commitments within the 14th Five Year Plan (coming in spring 2021). All in all, the EU seems to be moving towards demanding results, while keeping cool in nudging China towards delivering on its promises.

READINGS

- [EU-China Leaders' Meeting: Upholding EU values and interests at the highest level - Joint press release by President Michel, President von der Leyen and Chancellor Merkel](#), European Council, Sep 14
- [Statement by HE Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China At the General Debate of the 75th Session of The UNGA](#) - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Sep 22
- [China's carbon pledge revives hopes of a climate game change](#) - FT (Christian Shepherd), Sep 23

SUMMARY

Between August 30 and September 4, the Czech Senate President Miloš Vystrčil was on an official visit to Taiwan. The visit's highlight was Vystrčil's address to the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, during which he stated "I am Taiwanese" invoking JFK's famous speech. Of course, Mainland officials were not happy. Within 24 hours, Foreign Minister Wang Yi - who was at the time on a diplomatic mission in Germany - called the visit a "public provocation" and threatened that Vystrčil will pay "a very heavy price".

Wang's threats were met with a pushback from many European officials. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas rebuked them during Wang's visit, saying "they don't fit in here", with similar comments coming from the French Foreign Ministry, Commission Vice-President Věra Jourová, Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová or Slovenian PM Janez Janša. However, Vystrčil's trip was met domestically with criticism from leading Czech politicians - Czech PM Andrej Babiš called the Senate President an "amateur diplomat" whereas Czech President Miloš Zeman called the visit a "boyish provocation" also pointing out that Senate and regional elections in the Czech Republic were to take place only one month after the Taiwan visit.

In any case these developments attracted more attention to a wider question - should the EU reassess its 'One China' policy? Notably, 9 MEP's and China experts called for such a reassessment via articles released in Handelsblatt and Le Monde. According to them as China has been endangering the status quo through its increased pressure on Taiwan and undermining prospects of peaceful unification through its policy in Hong Kong, the EU needs to increase its support for Taiwan to maintain the status quo in the Strait of Taiwan. It is worth noting that in line with such thinking the EU and Taiwan held their first investment forum on September 22, while Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen pleaded for both sides to negotiate an investment deal.

FACTS AND FIGURES



Almost 90 people in Vystrčil's mission, including pro-Taiwanese mayor of Prague Zdeněk Hřib, the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and 7 other Senators.



Mainland China has so far performed 17 military exercises near Taiwan in 2020 - a higher number than in previous years: 2019 (8 exercises), 2018 (12 exercises), 2017 (15 exercises), 2016 (3 exercises).



Total EU-Taiwan trade flow stands at €50.5 billion - €23.6 billion worth of EU exports flow into Taiwan, and €27 billion worth of Taiwanese exports flow into the EU.



The EU is Taiwan's 4th largest trading partner, Taiwan is the EU's 15th largest trading partner.



The EU is the largest provider of FDI in Taiwan (25% of total). Only 1.7% of Taiwan's FDI flows into the EU.

QUOTES



"Please let me also express in person my support to Taiwan and the ultimate value of freedom and conclude today's speech with perhaps a more humble, but equally strong statement: 'I am a Taiwanese.'"

Miloš Vystrčil, Czech Senate President



"We have to tell the Czech Senate speaker: You've crossed the line. [...] [Vystrčil will] pay a high price for his short-sighted behavior."

Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC



"We as Europeans act in close cooperation – we offer our international partners respect, and we expect the exact same from them. Threats don't fit in here."

Heiko Maas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany



"Europe's strategy must not be revisionist. We support the preservation of the status quo. Our logic must be based on a dialectic: since the PRC has seriously endangered this status quo by its recent actions, Europe must also change its policy on the Taiwan question, in order to help preserve stability."

Article by 9 MEPs and China experts in Le Monde

TAKEAWAY

As the systemic rivalry aspect of EU-China relations is increasingly coming into the forefront over the last months, the EU has been paying increased attention to Taiwan and the Czech Senate President's trip gave the discussions on this topic additional impetus. Though Vystrčil's trip does seem to have had domestic political connotations, the controversy surrounding it could help to trigger an adjustment in the EU's One China policy.

It is possible that we will be looking at intensification of EU-Taiwan relations, which are already evaluated as "excellent" by EEAS' Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific, Gunnar Wiegand. The Investment Forum is an example of moves towards that goal, but we may also see more international support from the EU granted to Taiwan.

The logic of such actions could be derived from the article in Handelsblatt/Le Monde that we mentioned above - the EU should not seek to support Taiwan's independence (even Vystrčil said this after returning to Prague). Instead, it should seek to empower Taiwan to resist pressure from the Mainland, support the status quo and give a signal to Beijing that, if it is not respected, there will be consequences.

READINGS

- Germany and France stand up for Prague in light of China's threats, Euractiv (Aneta Zachová), Sep 2
- Europa muss seine China-Politik ändern, Handelsblatt (Reinhard Bütikofer François Godement Hanns Maull Volker Stanzel), Sep 14
- EU-Taiwan Relations - European Economic and Trade Office, 2020

SUMMARY

Throughout September, prospects of completing negotiations on the **Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)** by the end of the year didn't seem to increase significantly - despite the EU leaders' video conference with President Xi Jinping. China calls upon the EU to apply a more "mutually accommodating spirit", as Ambassador Zhang Ming told the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee. But the EU argues that "meeting halfway" is unacceptable, given the uneven playing field and pushes for China to deliver on market openness commitments.

To get a full picture, we took a look this month at what European and Chinese businesses think about openness in each other's markets. Reports published by Chambers of Commerce on both sides complain about enhanced market barriers and a politicization of commerce.

For EU businesses in China, the main headache is the emergence of 'One Economy, Two Systems', which has either quenched market openness in favor of SOEs or has delivered toothless access in sectors already dominated by Chinese companies.

On the other hand, Chinese businesses in the EU complained about investment screening, procurement screening, and new FDI standards constitute protectionist market barriers. Chinese businesses also criticized the EU for securitizing sectors of the economy that they don't regard as security-related, and suggested that more dialogue and less "overregulation" are needed.

FACTS AND FIGURES



'One Economy, Two Systems' remains the guiding principle of China's economy. If you're curious to find out more about this concept, listen to our podcast with Charlotte Roule, the Vice President of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.



97 Chinese state-owned enterprises are under the direct control of SASAC, which allowed them to dominate their sectors without competition from foreign business.



Among Chinese businesses in Europe, 68% think the EU has tightened its China policy, and 72% think the EU market is becoming grimmer (compared to 2019).



55% of Chinese businesses in Europe have a harder time hiring European and foreign talent because of reputation issues.

QUOTES



"I hope that the two sides could work together in a mutually accommodating spirit, with a view to reaching a comprehensive, balanced and high-level agreement this year, which can stand the test of times and satisfy the people in both China and the EU."

Zhang Ming, PRC Ambassador to the EU



"The fact that the reform took place so late in the game made it more akin to letting foreign investors onto a railway platform only after the train had long since departed."

European Business in China - Position Paper - EUCCC



"The change in narrative, increased scrutiny, and the EU's proposed legislation on foreign governments' subsidies are the three biggest hurdles for Chinese companies in Europe, spelling uncertainty for their investment, survival, and development"

CCCEU Recommendation Report

TAKEAWAY

When both Brussels and Beijing decry politicization of markets, it's important to remember that we are comparing apples to oranges. The European market is much more open to Chinese businesses than the other way round, therefore Brussels unwillingness to "meet halfway" stems from its commitment to countering the existing market openness asymmetry.

Measures taken now by Brussels are primarily aimed at protecting the EU's common market and countering or preventing unfair exploitation. This is not easily comparable with Chinese economy, where foreign companies are fully barred from many significant sectors or have to compete with domestic rivals enjoying access to subsidies or supported by entire value chains linked to the state.

Notably, the EUCCC report highlights one other essential issue: the EU and China seem to approach "openness" in a starkly different way - while the EU sees it more as a "right" stemming from the multilateral, open model of economy based on fair competition, China sees openness more as a "privilege" that can be granted or withdrawn. Those different approaches underlie the different outlook on the nature of the CAI negotiations - as a way to rebalance asymmetry that contradicts how the system should work, or as a bargaining about how many privileges are to be granted at own expense.

READINGS

- [Committee on Foreign Affairs](#) - European Parliament, Sep 21
- [CCCEU 2020 Recommendation Report - Acting for Common Future](#) - China Chamber of Commerce to the EU, Sep 10
- [European Business In China Position Paper 2020/2021](#) - European Union Chamber of Commerce in China

SUMMARY

Over the last few weeks, both the United States and China have made repeated attempts to nudge the EU on its position amid growing tensions between Washington and Beijing through an intensification of diplomatic visits. On China's side, the most noteworthy efforts were made by Foreign Minister Wang Yi (August 25-September 1; Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, France and Germany) and high-profile CCP diplomat Yang Jiechi (3-4 September; Greece and Spain), who undertook trips to convince major EU member states not to join the US chorus against China. However, discourse deployed by Wang Yi was far from conciliatory - during his European tour he issued threats towards the Czech Senate Leader over his Taiwan visit, questioned the origins of COVID-19, lectured Norway's Nobel committee on who not to assign the prize to, while not making any wider commitments on issues deemed important by the European side failing to substantiate a shift in China's approach.

Washington was more successful in promoting its interests in Europe. The tours made by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are particularly noteworthy. In August he visited the Central and Eastern Europe managing to gain considerable support for the US' China agenda. During his most recent trip (September 27 - October 2; Greece, Italy, the Vatican, and Croatia) Pompeo focused his messaging mostly around security and defence (including on China-related cybersecurity issues) and gaining support from most visited governments with an exception of the Vatican. Also US Undersecretary Keith Krach's mission of promoting a "Clean Network" was warmly received in Brussels on September 30th by the Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton.

That being said, it is important to note that this does not equate to the EU "picking a side", which is something that Brussels has been adamant about. However, even looking to boost its Strategic Autonomy and deliberating further on the Sinatra Doctrine, the EU's point can be summarized by a statement made by Gunnar Wiegand, EEAS Managing Director for Asia and Pacific at the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee hearing: "while we maintain close relations with China and the US, we are unequivocally non-equidistant. The Transatlantic relationship runs close and deep, whatever the policy differences may be."

FACTS AND FIGURES



Altogether, Wang Yi and Yang Jiechi visited 7 countries. The former visited Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, France, and Germany; the latter went to Spain and Greece.



Mike Pompeo visited the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Austria, Poland, Greece, Italy, the Vatican, Croatia.



The essence of HR Josep Borrell's strategic thinking is the 'Sinatra Doctrine', which pleads for inclining (though not allying) with the US, but also maintaining constructive dialogue with China wherever possible.



News over human rights abuses against China's ethnic minorities have intensified, with reports emerging on forced labour in Tibet, destruction of sacred places in Xinjiang, and diluted language rights in Inner Mongolia.



In her SOTEU speech, Ursula von der Leyen promised the Commission will put forward a European Mangitsky Act, to sanction human rights abuses abroad.

QUOTES



"Independence from two competitors does not mean being at equal distance from them. Our lengthy common history and shared values with the US mean that we are closer to Washington than we are to Beijing."

Josep Borrell, EU High Representative



"While we maintain close relations with China and the US, we are unequivocally non-equidistant. The Transatlantic relationship runs close and deep, whatever the policy differences may be."

Gunnar Wiegand, EEAS Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific



"We believe that no countries would take part in [a new Cold War]. And we believe they will collectively oppose anyone who wants to pull the world back to the rule of jungle."

Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC



"The Chinese Communist Party is trying to exploit its presence in Italy for its own strategic purposes. They are not here to make sincere partnerships"

Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State

TAKEAWAY

It has long been clear that both the US and China have been trying to convince the EU to lean towards their side within their competition. But China's strategy of achieving that has so far been quite puzzling when judged from the European point of view.

Neither Xi Jinping, Wang Yi, nor Yang Jiechi seemed to offer anything of substance to the EU, pursuing the worn and unconvincing "comprehensive strategic partnership" rhetoric while at the same time being increasingly assertive, borderline aggressive in "systemic rivalry" pushbacks. This shows that Beijing is either overconfident towards the EU or that it doesn't have an idea of what to offer to Brussels given that the two parties are increasingly diverging on most issues - with notable exception of climate, but here Beijing would have to deliver beyond simple commitments. That being said, systemic rivalry is only bound to grow, as more evidence of coercive cultural assimilation comes out from Tibet and Inner Mongolia (on top of Xinjiang). To that end, a European Magnitsky Act could deliver a strong message that such actions constitute red lines that the EU cannot accept, which would inevitably result in Beijing's pushback.

In that context also remember that this will play a role in economic cooperation as well. Even if negotiations on CAI are brought to a successful conclusion, the agreement would have to be ratified by the European Parliament - which will most weigh in the measures in place to address human rights concerns as shown by its past actions and hearings.

READINGS

- [The Sinatra Doctrine: Building a United European Front](#) - Institut Moontaigne (Josep Borrell), Sep 9
- [China is trying to mend fences in Europe. It's not going well.](#) Washington Post (Gerry Shih), Sep 2
- [Mike Pompeo gets Italian promise on 5G security but doesn't convince Vatican on bishops deal with China](#), SCMP (Stuart Lau), Oct 1

SPECIAL EUROPEAN COUNCIL SUMMIT - MOVING TOWARDS A JOINT EU'S CHINA POLICY

SUMMARY

A special European Council took place on **October 1-2** to discuss multiple internal and external issues linked to Strategic Autonomy. Regarding China, the EU27 leaders agreed to reaffirm the 2019 Strategic Outlook (around 18 months after it was proposed by the previous Commission and the High Representative), repeated their support for completing the CAI negotiations by the end of the year, and were in agreement to organize a summit with Xi in Brussels at an unspecified date in 2021. Importantly, leaders established a March 2021 deadline for EU institutions to compile a progress report on the implementation of the 2019 Strategic Outlook showing that they are serious about this approach. Importantly, there will be a follow-up to those discussions on China, as the leaders are to meet at an informal Council in Berlin on November 16 - well after the US election.

Speaking of Berlin, it is worth taking note of Chancellor Merkel's shifting approach (which also comes amidst moves in Germany to impose strict 5G legislation that would severely restrict Huawei's operations). Even ahead of the Summit, in the speech to Bundestag, Merkel lauded China for its new climate commitments, but she decried its "dreadful and often horrible treatment of minority rights" and criticized lack of progress on CAI negotiations. In regard to this last point, speaking after the Council Merkel made it clear that lack of market access will have reverberations on China's access to the European market.

This was the first instance in which Merkel warned of countermeasures, which is notable as the German Chancellor has been one of the EU leaders most committed to maintaining positive economic relations with Beijing. For more info on this topic and for a full round up of the most important outcomes of the European Council, check out our weekly briefing from October 5th.

FACTS AND FIGURES



EU27 leaders reaffirmed commitment to the 2019 Strategic Outlook and expect a progress report on it by March 2021.



The next leaders' meeting will be chaired by Merkel in Berlin on November 16.



A summit between EU leaders and Xi Jinping is expected to happen in 2021, at a date yet to be determined.



Macron did not attend the second day of the European Council (when China was discussed) with Merkel presenting both German and French position.



Merkel has toughened her stance on China, criticizing it publicly for lack of progress on CAI and for human rights abuses.

QUOTES



"China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance."

EU-China Strategic Outlook 2019



"EU leaders encouraged China to assume greater responsibility in dealing with global challenges, in particular regarding climate. They welcomed President Xi's statement that China will aim to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060."

EU Council - Press Release



"If there is no market access from the Chinese side for certain areas, this will of course also be reflected in the fact that market access to the European market will be narrower"

Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany

TAKEAWAY

With EU leaders all jointly agreeing to support the 2019 Strategic Outlook, we are on the right track to move forward with joint EU China policy. Also setting a deadline for March 2021 for a deliverable from the Institutions could go a long way. Such a "blessing" by the Council can improve Brussels' position in adopting solutions similar to investment screening mechanisms or in monitoring Chinese FDI in general. Remember the European Court of Auditors' assessment that lack of willingness of member states to report and communicate with the Commission on their dealings with China - perhaps now Brussels can have greater sway. We will be closely watching the informal meeting of the Council on November 16 focused strictly on China policy.

It is perhaps not a coincidence that this level of cohesion overlaps with a meaningful shift in Merkel's rhetoric on China - which in turn happens while the German 5G market appears to be moving towards heavily restricting access to Huawei. And if Germany becomes more open towards being more assertive to China, this also could be a breakthrough in EU's China policy.

We would also like to recommend your attention to the challenge of appropriate assessment of China's activity and influence in Central and Eastern Europe. If approached correctly, the member states of the region could become stakeholders in the new joint European China policy.

READINGS

- [Special European Council, 1-2 October 2020](#) - European Council
- [Angela Merkel warns China to do more to open up or risk more restrictions on EU market access](#) - SCMP (Stuart Lau), Oct 3
- [Germany crackdown set to exclude Huawei from 5G rollout](#) - Financial Times (Guy Chazan), Sep 30

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