EU-China Briefing - 15 June 2020

Written By GS

YOUR WEEKLY SHOT OF EU-CHINA NEWS

BY FLAVIAN BERNEAGĂ AND GRZEGORZ STEC

Click & Read:

  1. EU-China Strategic Dialogue and the Emergence of ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ [1:27]

  2. Human Rights and Competition - Parliament's Resolution, Commission's White Paper [10:22]

  3. EU Moves to Tackle Digital Disinformation Mentioning China [16:55]

  4. EU Chamber of Commerce in China - Business Confidence Survey 2020 [23:48]

  5. Amidst Internal Troubles, NATO Acknowledges China Challenge [30:25]

 

1. EU-China Strategic Dialogue and the Emergence of ‘Sinatra Doctrine’

On June 9, HR Josep Borrell and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a three-hour conversation on bilateral issues, including preparations for the EU-China Summit happening later this month.

► One of the most important points of these talks was the attempt to define the phrase ‘systemic rivalry’, first employed by the EU in March 2019.;

► The Chinese side was criticized by Brussels for reporting domestically only selected bits of the dialogue and for putting words into Borrell’s mouth;

► Borrell later issued a blog post in which he said the EU should strike the right balance in international relations and follow a Frank Sinatra inspired “My Way” strategy.

Softening ‘Systemic Rivalry’?

HR Borrell and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a video conference laying the groundwork for a summit later this month, which may include an important deliverable:the EU-China Agenda 2025.

  • The Agenda is still in the works but there are hopes on both sides that it will be ready in the time for the summit.

  • Talks on the coronavirus were not on the table but, reportedly, a vivid discussion was held on the topic of systemic rivalry. In the words of the High Representative: “[we] talked a lot about the systemic rival matter and what it means.”.

  • Borrell nonetheless indicated that the word “rival” is important in diplomatic language; because it is not a soft word” that he himself is not convinced what the EU means by the expression. “What does ‘rival’ mean? ‘Rival’ on what? Is ‘systemic’ a matter of rivalry between systems? Or is it a systematic rivalry? There are two interpretations.”

  • He later offered what he referred to as an example of “a good kind of explanation”, that “You cannot build a multilateral world without China participating in it effectively, not in a “Chinese way”, but in a way that can be accepted by everybody.”

  • In this vein, Borrell also stated that he does not believe China “can threaten world peace”, since it does not have any “military ambitions”. He doesn't mention cybersecurity issues.

  • 5G was also discussed, but Borrell highlighted market reciprocity considerations even more than security ones. He argued European companies developing the 5G network in China amount to only 10% of the market, which is lower than it had been for 4G.

  • Borrell raised the issue of human rights violations in Tibet and Xinjiang, and insisted that Beijing’s imposition of the national security law risks “to seriously undermine the 'One Country, Two Systems' principle and the high degree of autonomy of Hong Kong.” At the same time, he indicated that the EU will not follow in the footsteps of the UK in granting Hongkongers EU citizenship.

  • He expressed his hope that the usual human rights dialogue will continue once physical meetings can be held, indicating that they have not been run remotely.

  • Borrell and Wang also discussed disinformation and Borrell used the press briefing following the conversation to tell member states that he is most happy to fight disinformation to a higher extent, including communicating a positive narrative of the EU, but that he needs the EEAS to dedicate more resources for such actions to happen.

Not Quite the Same Account

The Chinese foreign ministry’s press release following the Dialogue came under fire by the EEAS for conveying a “selective and unbalanced account of the discussions”.

  • The release reported the EU wants to engage with China based on “dialogue and cooperation, not conflict and confrontation”.

  • The EU side was unhappy that, while the conference spent much time discussing the meaning of systemic rivalry, the press release did not mention this discussion and the comment quoted above seemed to send a different message.

  • A report by Xinhua, China’s state media, quoted Borrell saying that the EU “has high expectations for its relations with China and will make efforts to ensure closer ties” and that the EU “welcomes China’s active participation in international cooperation.”


Borrell and Sinatra

In a blog post on June 14, Josep Borrell argued that, as the international system faces more confrontation, the EU must resist calls to pick a side. This comes just ahead of his talks with Mike Pompeo, effectively ruling out a potential transatlantic alliance against China.

  • Borrell said that China’s role in global politics is impossible to ignore and that cooperation in many areas is essential.

  • Borrell toned down the narrative on “systemic rivalry”, arguing that relations with China are “unavoidably complex and multifaceted”.

  • EEAS spokesperson Virginie Battu-Henriksson doubled down on these remarks, arguing they fall in line with the 2019 Strategic Outlook, which defines China simultaneously as a cooperation partner, negotiation partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival.

  • Nonetheless, Borrell argued the EU should not be naive, because the EU and China have values and political systems that are fundamentally different.

  • In the same blog post, he said the transatlantic relationship must be preserved and the EU should engage with the growing competition between the US and China by laying a path of its own, a strategy Borrell alluded to earlier, on June 1, by referencing Frank Sinatra’s song, “My Way”.


Listen while reading the takeaways

TAKEAWAYS

 

► THE ‘MY WAY’ CHALLENGE
Doing it ‘My Way’ is the sort of policy headline that sounds really good, especially since the last few months have seen Washington and Beijing lock horns very often. That being said, the ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ is to be crafted in a challenging landscape. On the domestic front, ideally, it would mean one single, across-the-board policy stance from the EU27, but that is certainly not the status quo. Germany or Hungary are interested in deepening cooperation with China in trade and infrastructure, while Czech Republic or Romania prefer alignment with the US and refuse Chinese investment and Huawei’s 5G rollout. And we are not even going down to the level of national debates.

On the external front, ‘My Way’ does not necessarily imply the EU treats the US and China in an absolutely similar manner or that by not aligning itself with the US on China, it chooses Beijing over Washington. After all, one of those is a democracy. Rather, it implies that if hard anti-China discourse galvanizes in Washington, the EU will not join as part of a  common front, instead continuing to prefer multilateral alternatives.

► SO WHICH WAY?
The key challenge of the ‘My Way’ doctrine is that it is focused on what the EU doesn’t want rather than on what it wants in the new geopolitical circumstances. Consequently, as it is based primarily on resisting alignment with either side in the growing US-China divide, it is hardly a policy to follow until this “my way” gets defined in positive terms.

The idea to develop a more robust China strategy on the basis of European interests and values is ambiguous at best and doesn’t say specifically what those interests and values actually are, beyond being neither American nor Chinese. Such a blurry definition allows the EU to maintain the status quo of EU-China relations, similar to how the multifaceted definition of China in the Strategic Outlook from March 2019 has been trying to reconcile opposite dynamics: cooperation partner on one end of the spectrum and systemic rival on the other.

But overall, the EU’s approach appears to be retroactive or defensive (as shown in the case of economic securitisation of the domestic market) and at times borders on passivity (as shown in the HR’s and the member states’ response in Hong Kong).

Naturally, we may assume that Brussels “plays for time” to be able to shape a more united approach on China and the US under a “geopolitical Commission” in an internally divided EU combating the coronacrisis, but so far we are yet to see a breakthrough on EU's geostrategy. After all, saying what the EU wants rather than what it doesn’t remains a great challenge for the block. But let’s wait to see the EU-China Agenda 2025.

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2. Human Rights and Competition - Parliament's Resolution, Commission's White Paper

The two European institutions have pushed forward with actions that address different points of contention in relations with China:

► The European Parliament, with the backing of 5 out of its 6 largest political groups, is set to pass a strong resolution that urges other EU institutions to oppose Beijing’s moves on Hong Kong’s national security law and to significantly increase emphasis on human rights in relation with China;

► The only party not in agreement is the far-right “Identity and Democracy”, comprising the likes of Germany’s AfD, Italy’s Lega Nord, and Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement;

► A leaked draft of a European Commission ‘White Paper’ outlined further important aspects of the steps to bolster competition and regulate foreign subsidies.

Parliament: Human Rights

On June 12, the European Parliament drafted a resolution that seeks to recalibrate EU-China relations to bring systemic rivalry back into the spotlight, over human rights (e.g. in relation to Xinjiang) and rule of law (e.g. in relation to Hong Kong).

  • The resolution, supported by five of the six most important political groups in the European Parliament, denounces the breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and calls on PRC authorities to respect the “One-country, Two-systems” principle.

  • The main call of the Parliament is directed to the Council and the High Representative, urging them to treat Hong Kong as a “top priority” at the upcoming EU-China Summit and to address human rights breaches (e.g. in Xinjiang) at the planned “EU-China Leaders meeting” (a reference to the now-postponed Leipzig Summit).

  • The Parliament calls for the EU to “use economic leverage to economically challenge China’s crackdown on human rights”, stating that its ratification of a future trade or CAI deal will take under consideration human rights.

  • The resolution will most likely easily pass in Parliament, but it is not legally binding on the European Commission or the EU member states.

  • On the other hand, its importance stems from its near-complete unanimity, which means it cannot be ignored by Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel, and Josep Borrell in their meeting with Li Keqiang next week.

Commission: Competition

Also on June 12, POLITICO obtained a draft of a White Paper (which we mentioned last week) on foreign subsidies, set to be published by the Commission on June 17.

  • The plan will impact any non-EU firms operating in the EU’s single market and receiving subsidies that exceed the sum of €200,000 (over three-years).

  • This move seeks to close the gap for companies coming from outside of the EU, who have not had to comply with the bloc’s regulations on state aid.

  • The measure would be reinforced by a “supervisory authority” that could open investigations and restructure or fine companies that do not respect the new law.

  • The instrument would be composed of two tools:

    • Reviewing subsidies after an extra-EU country paid them

    • Obligating foreign investors to declare any acquisitions exceeding 35% of an EU company

  • EU regulators would have the power to open “in-depth investigations” if they believe large subsidies from foreign governments were spent in acquisitions. If any such acquisition falls outside the scope of the internal market’s rules, regulators can impose “commitments” or, ultimately, prohibit the acquisition.

  • The Commission is also in the process of crafting a competition tool that is ‘fit for the digital age’. The tool would extend the Commission’s powers in the already existing antitrust legal framework.

  • The Commission will be able to intervene in markets where competition is jeopardized. As such, it will tackle market tipping practices (in which one company obtains high monopoly profits and market share) and would expand its powers in digital antitrust regulations.

  • In the long term, this is important for US and Chinese companies seeking to enter the European market, because it implies stricter rules on competition than the status quo.

TAKEAWAYS

 

► INSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTIONS
While High Representative Borrell has been trying to develop a political space for a working relationship with China, focusing on issues such as reciprocity or climate change, with the upcoming resolution, the Parliament is clearly calling out the Commission on downplaying systemic rivalry with China, something that was visible in Borrell’s briefing after the Strategic Dialogue with Wang Yi and the following blog post. The extent to which the Parliament’s resolution will meaningfully impact EU-China relations will be visible as soon as the upcoming EU-China Summit on June 22.

► IPAC SYNDROME
A long-standing quality of Brussels’ approach to China, with its focus on values and interests, seems to rest with specific institutions. The European Parliament prides itself as the only institution whose members are directly elected and, as a result, it has always taken a more “democratic” stance and an assertive approach towards China. In this context, it is worth noting that the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China—which we talked about last week and which now has 104 legislators—just gained three more MEP’s, among them Guy Verhofstadt, former group leader of the Liberals and Democrats). 

However, the Parliament is not the executive branch in the EU and, when it comes to external relations, it is the Commission and the EEAS that lead the way. These two institutions are focused on achieving deliverable results (often surrounding trade and investments) and are more likely to have a compromise-based attitude towards China, compared to the Parliament, which focuses on political topics. So, the Parliament is right to ring a wake-up call on the need to avoid making systemic rivalry a hollow term. But the Commission and EEAS are most likely to see that implementation of most of the EP’s proposals would compromise cooperation with China on climate change, development support in Africa, or trade and investment exchange. We’re back to a values vs. interests debate.

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3. EU Moves to Tackle Digital Disinformation Mentioning China

On June 10, the European Commission issued a joint communication confronting the challenge of digital disinformation, starting with the disinformation campaigns that accompanied COVID-19.

► These efforts complement previous initiatives started in 2018, as part of the EU Action Plan against Disinformation;

► The Commission suggested creating an array of mechanisms of cooperation and coordination with member states that would tag manipulative content, increase user awareness, and enhance the already existing Rapid Alert System in the detection of disinformation;

► Social media platforms play a key role in the Commission’s plan, with a strong push in favor of fact-checking initiatives.

Previous Efforts

The basis for the current legal framework is the 2018 Action Plan against Disinformation, which set out to create a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to tackling fake news.

  • In turn, the plan was based on the experience gained by the EEAS StratCom Task Force, which was set up in 2015 with the goal of challenging disinformation stemming from Russia into the Eastern Neighbourhood countries.

  • In March 2019, a Rapid Alert System was established to put in contact experts in countering disinformation from EU institutions and member states, which allowed them to share expertise and analysis.

Current Efforts

Under the Commission’s current proposal, cooperation with member states would be significantly enhanced while, at the global level, the EU would engage with multilateral institutions to streamline similar efforts.

  • Within the joint communication, Russia and China are said to have run “targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns in the EU, in its neighborhood, and globally”.

  • It is the first time China is being called out directly, as opposed to previous EUvsDisinfo reports that used softer language when ascribing disinformation to China.

  • To counter these practices amid the pandemic, the Commission proposed a set of measures.

  • The Rapid Alert System would be awarded a special section on COVID-19 disinformation that would connect communication material between member states and EU institutions.

  • The Commission’s representatives in member states would play a more visible role in national debates, promoting fact-based information and adapting to local peculiarities.

  • At the international level, the EU would help the WHO improve epidemiological surveillance through media monitoring and early detection of false narratives.

  • In a similar vein, the EU would strive to employ its legal framework on disinformation to craft synonymous efforts with and within the G7, NATO, the OSCE, the African Union, and the Council of Europe.

Effects on Social Media

A core component of the proposal is the Code for Online Platform, which highlights the responsibility of major social media platforms to actively counter disinformation campaigns.

  • The most notable names on the list are Google, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Microsoft, and TikTok (whose data processing is being reviewed by the EDPB).

  • These platforms would be required to draft monthly reports on the steps they took to address COVID-19 disinformation. In essence, the Commission is telling social media platforms to step up their fact-checking game and conduct constant research to eliminate fake news.

  • These steps could include: promoting information from national and EU agencies; informing users when they come in contact with disinformation; reporting instances of manipulative behaviour; or limiting ad placement related to COVID-19 disinformation.

  • To aid these efforts, the proposal brings forward a few initiatives: the European Digital Media Observatory, a multidisciplinary community of fact-checkers and academic researchers; the Digital Education Action Plan Update; and the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan.

  • The Commission’s proposal comes at a time when Twitter deleted over 170,000 accounts believed to have aided China’s disinformation campaign on COVID-19.

  • It also comes in the context of Zoom acknowledging it had deliberately shut down virtual commemorations of the 1989 brutal crackdown on Tiananmen Square protesters, as a result of Chinese government officials asking to block access for Chinese nationals.

  • More worrying is the fact that Zoom indicated it will continue to help China block accounts of users within the PRC. (Bear in mind that the company also transfers its data through China.)

  • When asked about the Commission proposal and the deleted Twitter accounts, the Chinese MFA stated those are baseless accusations and accused Twitter of “blatant double standards” against China.

TAKEAWAYS

 

► STEPPING UP THE DISINFORMATION GAME
The joint communication is an important step forward in the process of the Commission acknowledging the big issues related to disinformation that the EU has faced in the past 2-3 months. It is a clear signal that the problem is acknowledged and measures to tackle it are being studied. That being said, the joint communication is not yet substantial. It talks a lot about boosting cooperation (indicating it is still dependent on member states) and the code for online platforms is voluntary. It is a step in the right direction, but most definitely not a final destination. The EU should make use of its single market to convince more digital platforms to adhere to these standards (a feat otherwise called the “Brussels Effect”).

► CCP GOES GLOBAL
We talked about China’s disinformation actions extensively throughout April, referring especially to activity on Twitter, which has become a channel of communication for the wolf warrior diplomats and one of the battlegrounds of the “global battle of narratives”. While this points to potential misuse of social media platforms, the Zoom story points out at yet another challenge.

That is the issue of self-imposed censorship by companies wanting to remain active in the Chinese market, which has been long-standing. For example, foreign companies often apologize for advertising that “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people” (in some cases addressing legitimate claims about racist stereotypes, but more often relating to political issues). In the case of social media companies, such behaviours directly affect their uses, creating much greater challenges (including in regard to user data protection). But if policies like the one applied by Zoom becomes widespread, it would undermine also the academic freedoms of Chinese students abroad and give the Party-State a tool to limit the impact of dissidents who have moved abroad.

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4. China Moves Towards “One Economy, Two Systems” - Business Confidence Survey 2020 by EU Chamber in China

On June 10, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China published a report based on their Business Confidence Survey, conducted in February 2020 and updating the status of European businesses operating in China.

► The survey identified that fewer companies have seen growth (the lowest number over the past decade) and almost half noted their businesses became more difficult, particularly for SMEs;

► The core concern revolves around “One Economy, Two Systems”, a phrase explaining China’s contradictory policy of opening and liberalizing in some sectors, while at the same time privileging certain SOEs in others;

► 11% of respondents plan to diversify their supply chains and there are no signs that European businesses favor relocation, as most companies indicate they are “in China, for China”.

Lethargic Growth

Financial reporting for 2019 indicated a worse situation than in previous years, as year-on-year growth dropped.

  • Even before the pandemic entered in full force, only 50% of companies saw year-on-year growth (the lowest level since 2010) and only 41% of respondents thought the market opened further in 2019.

  • Small and Medium Enterprises (SME’s) were even more impacted, with only 46% witnessing growth. They were also later impacted by the virus, as they had limited cash flow and their access to bank loans was limited, given deposit withdrawal by bigger companies. 

  • The virus-induced economic crisis has been particularly damaging for supply chains. The experience of the SARS epidemic did not prove particularly helpful, as this time the situation also affected markets outside of China and global demand.

  • Different Chinese provinces pursued fragmented responses, which made reassembling supply chains very challenging, particularly where the entire supply chain depends on a key part, e.g. cars cannot be produced unless they have brakes.

  • Added to this were coronavirus-induced travel restrictions on foreigners, which lengthened the entry process or outright made it impossible, thus keeping business partners and technical experts out of the country and putting projects on hold.


“One Economy, Two Systems”

The Chamber used the expression to describe China’s encouragement of market forces in selected sectors, while at the same time making SOEs  “bigger, better, stronger” in critical sectors of the economy.

  • Almost 50% of respondents faced market access barriers, with 15% of them categorizing these barriers as ‘direct’. 44% expected 2020 to bring more restrictive regulations, while only 29% expected regulations to be relaxed.

  • 49% indicated business became more difficult. This is a drop from 53% in 2019, but one that the Chamber describes as “baby steps [that] are simply not enough”.

  • Businesses were most worried that the economic shock of the pandemic would tempt the Chinese government to further shift resources from private enterprises in favour of SOEs in key sectors of the economy.

  • The problem they have with SOEs is that they distort the market by relying more on state investments and having facilitated access to credit (since the state can guarantee for debt repayment), while not having similar profitability requirements.

  • The Chinese government has nonetheless sent messages that its economic recovery will support SMEs as well, although exact policies remain to be seen.


Staying Put

Even though they acknowledge that overreliance on one supplier is a dilemma, European businesses are less likely to consider relocation, compared to their US and Japanese counterparts.

  • Only 11% of surveyees indicated plans to move investments to markets outside China. That is the case for export-centred companies, which has not much to do with market access. The number reportedly has not increased significantly during the pandemic.

  • The main point is that European business in China no longer produce with the primary scope of exports. They produce “in China, for China”.

  • Moreover, the pandemic has not impacted the efficiency of supply chains related to China, and European businesses are already well established within the Chinese ecosystem, having suppliers, logistics, and subcontractors all in one place. Relocating and re-building a similar ecosystem would inflict high costs with guarantee of success.

  • 69% of businesses questioned believed China was more innovative than Europe and maintained hopes to further access the market that fuels innovation.

Be sure to listen to our podcast interview with Charlotte Roule, the Vice President of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China

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TAKEAWAYS

 

► DIVERSIFICATION - BUSINESS & POLITICS
The findings of the survey conducted by the EU Chamber well complement the discussions on diversification of supply chains that have occupied Brussels, especially in mid-April (visit report). Given that the European businesses are at large determined to stay “in China, for China” and primarily see relocation as a challenging and costly endeavour rather than an opportunity, the diversification discussed by Brussels will indeed remain limited to strategic supply chains. However, this is exactly the point on which business and political logics may clash, as defining which goods are strategic remains firmly in the political realm. This aspect of the discussion on diversifying from China will be key to observe.

► CAI CHALLENGE
The EU and China don’t seem to be converging on a key issue in CAI negotiations: competitive neutrality of SOEs and limits to distortion of markets caused by state aid. Parallel to the emergence of China’s “one economy, two systems” and inclinations to make the SOEs “bigger, better, stronger”, the EU is moving to further securitise its market against foreign state-aided market distortions and takeovers, as we discussed in a previous newsbite. Along with the negative perception in China of FDI investment screening mechanism (going operational in October 2020), the inclinations to limit Huawei’s access, the European Parliament’s request to include human rights clauses in the agreements, and postponement of the Leipzig Summit, it looks like circumstances for successfully concluding negotiations this year are slim. Likely, we will get a better readout of the situation after the EU-China Summit, scheduled for June 22.

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5. Amidst Internal Troubles, NATO Acknowledges China Challenge

Just as rumours emerged that Donald Trump plans to cut the number of US soldiers deployed in Germany, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg suggested that NATO’s vision for 2030 should look into the security challenges associated with China's rise.

► NATO’s headaches are not new and Trump’s decision is the latest in a series of jabs taken at NATO’s resilience in Western Europe;

► In this context, Jens Stoltenberg’s turn to China is indicative of NATO attempting to find renewed purpose.

Old Habits, New Problems

On June 5, it was reported that Donald Trump signed a memorandum that sets a cap on the number of American soldiers in Germany on 25,000 solciers, a reduction of 25%.

  • While official confirmation of this action is yet to surface, the news created much consternation in Europe, where no ally was informed of the move in advance.

  • Such a reduction would fall in line with Donald Trump’s transactional understanding of NATO: defense would not be provided where at least 2% of GDP is not spent on defence.

  • The move could give impetus to those in Europe who support the formation of an EU defense union, such as French President Emmanul Macron, who called NATO ‘braindead’ back in November 2019.

  • On the other hand, some argue that Trump will be relocating said soldiers to other allies in Eastern Europe who fulfill the 2% threshold, with Poland appearing to be in pole-position.

NATO Turns to China?

In the midst of these issues, Jens Stoltenberg presented on June 8 his “reflection on NATO 2030”, in which he argued member countries ought to form a cohesive alliance as China has become the world’s second largest military force.

  • China’s military rise shifts the global balance of power, Stoltenberg argued, as its presence is seen in multiple areas including cybersecurity and new technologies as well as regions ranging from Africa to the Arctic.

  • He talked of China’s rise as an element that is “multiplying the threats to open societies and individual freedoms, and increasing the competition over our values and our way of life.”

  • Stoltenberg maintained that NATO needs political unity and investment in new technologies in order to remain relevant from a military standpoint.

  • He refused to categorize China as NATO’s new adversary, but argued NATO should collaborate with allies in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, to maintain global norms and standards on cyberspace, outer space, and arms control.

  • In some sense, NATO is simply acknowledging the obvious, since China has been an important global actor for over a decade now. Pundits argue Stoltenberg’s message is also a strategy to give more salience to NATO in the White House, as the two converge on a ‘tough on China’ approach.

TAKEAWAYS

 

► ONE OUT OF MANY
Remarks by Mr Stoltenberg come in the context of other ideas that are being floated. Similar attempts to create platforms that address the challenges related to systemic rivalry with China already appeared in the investigation on the origins of COVID-19 (that turned out to be unsuccessful given what happened at the last World Health Assembly, as we reported here). One other attempt is the proposal by the UK and the Five Eyes to create a D10 formula, which would bring together the current G7 members, plus Australia, India, and South Korea. Its scope would be to address 5G security issues and the strategic vulnerability of supply chains. Interestingly, an idea similar to a D10 format has been discussed for years already in the Atlantic Council, the institution which Mr. Stoltenberg addressed in his speech.

► REINVENTING THE WHEEL
Banding together to stand up to China is not enough for the EU to join a club. This was already made explicit when HR Borrell declined an invitation from Australia, the UK and the US to co-sign a resolution on Hong Kong. Economic interests aside, the EU is also committed to its multilateral globalisation model and turning against China while holding hands with the unilateralist United States of Donald Trump does not sound appealing. Understandably, the upcoming American elections have a chance to change this. Recently, one of the top foreign-policy advisors of the democratic candidate Joe Biden commented on the importance of creating a multinational axis to engage China on contested issues. She/he said, “when China is engaged in practices that are unfair, and we want them to change, it’s a lot harder for them to ignore 60% of the world’s GDP than it is to ignore a quarter of it [roughly the weight of the American economy ~ECH].” A more alliance-minded and conciliatory US could become a partner with the EU on multiple fronts, potentially limiting the EU’s incentives to avoid confrontation with China.

The tendency for such a reflection shows the widespread acknowledgement of the systemic challenge posed by China to the democratic (or Western, depending on your point of view) international system. Ideas for a new format are gaining traction, although not necessarily with the EU.

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