EU-China Briefing - 31 August 2020

Written By GS

YOUR WEEKLY SHOT OF EU-CHINA NEWS

BY FLAVIAN BERNEAGĂ AND GRZEGORZ STEC

Click & Read:

  1. Wang Yi Tours Europe with a Damage Control Mission

  2. The Latest on Little Leipzig

  3. The EU and China Take Opposing Stances on Belarus

  4. Czech Senate President Visits Taiwan

  5. New Insights into Internal CCP Struggles Come to Light

 

1. Wang Yi Tours Europe with a Damage Control Mission

On August 26, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi began an official European tour, which comes just two weeks after American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s tour.

► Wang is visiting, in order, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, France, and Germany;

► His tour is aimed at preventing Europe from aligning with the US on China despite increased tensions in Sino-European relations. But it is also meant to lay the groundwork for the EU-China video conference on September 14;

►Wang’s trip is not without hurdles. Reports indicate that his visits have been met with criticism from both activists and legislators who oppose China’s actions in Hong Kong.

China’s Response to Pompeo’s Tour

Two weeks after Pompeo came to Central and Eastern Europe to talk about the ‘new Cold War’, Wang Yi is engaging in a similar diplomatic endeavour to advocate for the exact opposite.

  • Wang has already met with his counterparts in Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and France; next week he will finish his trip by visiting Germany. 

  • It is the first foreign visit by Wang Yi since the COVID-19 crisis started, which signifies the diplomatic importance that China attaches to ensuring constructive relations with Europe.

  • Wang’s task is primarily to convince European countries not to join hands with the US and is framed as the need to resist “protectionism and unilateralism, and the mentality of the Cold War”.

Country by Country

Here is a quick summary of what Wang said and did in each of the countries he visited.

  • Italy - August 25

    • Meeting Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, Wang stated China “has no intention of launching a new Cold War”; Di Maio responded that Italy expects Hong Kong’s freedoms to be maintained.

    • The two did not mention Huawei or 5G at all, showing that Wang was treading carefully in a country where the biggest telecom operator (TIM) has ruled out Huawei from its operations.

  • Netherlands - August 26

    • Wang’s meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Stef Blok was scheduled to revolve around trade, but Blok raised concerns about “worrying developments” in Hong Kong, and said that the Netherlands expects religious freedom to be upheld in Xinjiang and Tibet.

  • Norway - August 27

    • Meeting with Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide, Wang talked about Norway's upcoming rotational stint at the UN Security Council, but also warned against giving the Nobel Prize to Hong Kong activists and suggested COVID-19 did not originate in China.

    • This visit marked the first high-level Chinese official visit to Norway in 15 years, an interval prolonged by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010.

  • France - August 28 and 29

    • In Paris, Wang met French President Emmanuel Macron and Foreign Minister Yves Le Drian. Discussions focused on 5G, where Macron said France will not ban Huawei, but indicated he prefers a European provider, such as Ericsson or Nokia.

    • Macron also expressed his concerns to Wang on human rights breaches in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. However, in a speech at a Paris-based think tank IFRI, Wang Yi claimed that there are no more detainees in Xinjiang saying “Now all of them have graduated, there is no one in the education and training centre now."

    • Notably, Laurent Fabius, President of France's Constitutional Council lauded China as a "guarantor of the international multilateral order" given its support for the Paris climate accord and Iran nuclear deal.

  • Germany - September 1

    • Wang’s trip is scheduled to end on Tuesday, September 1, where he will meet with Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas.

    • Three German legislators—Margarete Bause, Gyde Jensen, and Michael Brand—issued a letter to Maas, calling on him to pressure Wang to push for closing internment camps in Xinjiang.

    • Merkel, on the other hand, indicated Germany wants “continue the conversation and set an example for multilateralism”, even if that means talking about Hong Kong.

Parliamentarian Protests

Wang Yi’s trip has also stirred activist groups who gathered in countries he visited to protest the Hong Kong national security law.

  • In every capital Wang visited, the IPAC supported protests against China’s actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet. For example, while Wang met with Di Maio in Rome, Italian lawmakers arranged for a meeting with Hong Kong activist-in-exile Nathan Law at the Italian Foreign Ministry.

  • In Berlin, the IPAC has planned a protest at the Berlin Wall, evoking similar sentiments, and additional demonstrations will take place in front of the German Foreign Office in Berlin.

TAKEAWAYS

 

► HOT DESTINATIONS

Wang’s visit happened just one month after Pompeo’s speech on ‘Communist China and the Free World’ and just two weeks after his tour around Central and Eastern Europe, which was more focused on security and NATO. Wang’s choice of destinations also makes sense. The selected countries are predominantly economic heavyweights of Europe and also have high stakes in maintaining good economic relations with China, particularly in light of post-pandemic recovery and CAI negotiations. 

While convincing those heavy-weights against aligning with the US on China is a goal in itself, China surely also wants to leverage their influence on the EU as a whole. The recent jump-start of common response on the Hong Kong national security law by a Franco-German tandem once again showed their capacity in shaping the EU’s foreign policy. Chinese foreign policy makers have long favored such a bilateral game and the fact that Wang has not visited Brussels is another example of such a trend.

It is also notable that while Wang visited Southern, Northern, and Western Europe, he did not go to the CEE, which was either deemed less strategically relevant or too critical towards China following Pompeo’s tour. Interestingly, we still are waiting for announcements of a date for the 17+1 Summit, postponed from April.

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2. The Latest on Little Leipzig

On September 14, EU leaders and Chinese President are expected to have a videoconference that would partially serve to replace the now postponed in-person EU27-China summit in Leipzig.

► The videoconference is expected to bring together Commissioner von der Leyen, President Michel, Chancellor Merkel (and perhaps President Macron), as well as President Xi Jinping;

► The European visits by Wang Yi and Yang Jiechi are expected to serve as damage control prior to the videoconference with Xi Jinping; 

► Trade and CAI are likely to be on top of the agenda, but the EU’s capacity to move fast with the CAI may be undermined by the resignation of Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan on August 26.

Recap

At the initiative of the German Council Presidency, Merkel, von der Leyen, Michel (and perhaps Macron) are to meet over video conference with Xi Jinping on September 14, and the topics are likely to revolve around trade, CAI, Hong Kong, and systemic rivalry.

  • The top priority of the agenda will be the negotiations on the CAI, which the two sides have been hoping to finalize by the end of 2020, though this goal seems increasingly unachievable.

  • One other purpose for the summit is the wish on the EU side to convey that Europe will speak with one voice that will be distinct from Washington’s hawkish tone.

  • Even so, EU leaders have indicated earlier in the summer that they are losing patience on China’s reforms towards a more level playing field on investment. In June and July, von der Leyen, along with Commissioners Dombrovskis and Hogan, said explicitly that China needs to make more meaningful commitments and be more ambitious if the deal is to succeed.

  • The stakes to finalize CAI negotiations were raised on July 28, when the EU reportedly linked the CAI to signing the agreement on the EU-China 2025 Agenda.

Setting the Stage

With nearly two weeks left until the summit, China is trying to smooth out tensions and lay the groundwork.

  • Aside from Wang Yi’s tour (which we talk about in detail in a previous bite), Yang Jiechi, the director of the CCP’s foreign affairs office and a closer ally to Xi than Wang, was sent on a similar diplomatic assignment in Europe.

  • Yang is scheduled to undertake trips in Greece, Spain, and, perhaps, Portugal, but the timing of his assignment right after Wang shows Xi is intended to convey that Europe is a strategic partner.

  • The diplomatic efforts may prove insufficient. The September summit is seen in EU circles as a “make or break” opportunity for China to prove it is serious about market access, but chances to finalize negotiations by December are slim, according to an anonymous EU diplomat.

Unhealthy Shake-Up

On August 26, Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan—one of the leading figures in CAI negotiations—resigned, after allegations that he did not respect quarantine and social distancing rules during a trip to Ireland.

  • Specifically, Hogan attended an indoor event for a golfing society with 80 of Ireland’s top politicians, despite Irish COVID-19 regulations allowing for indoor gatherings of no more than 6 people.

  • Though he apologized a few days after, Hogan displayed multiple inconsistencies in his account of the incident to von der Leyen, which resulted in him handing in his resignation.

  • While the Irish government will decide on a new proposition for Commissioner, Commission VP Valdis Dombrovskis will take on the the role of interim trade commissioner.

TAKEAWAYS

 

► UNITY CHALLENGE

So far, there are no official reports of Macron attending, though his presence at the video conference seems likely. This is both good and bad. It is good, because the Franco-German locomotive has managed to jump-start some important breakthroughs, such as the Next Generation EU fund or the consensus reached on Hong Kong. Macron and Merkel (who will join  video conference because of the German Presidency) form a powerful tandem and their cooperation helps the EU speak more easily  with one voice.

But that’s also the problem: 2 voices are not 27 voices, and Macron’s attendance would suggest to other states that Germany and France are the ones calling the shots while the other 25 countries should sit on the sidelines and accept what’s already agreed, although potentially advocating for some adjustments. Charles Michel wanted to have a European Council after the video conference, but that means that the EU25 leaders would nonetheless get to join the discussion much later than the French President. All in all, the spirit of a proper, in-person EU27-Xi Leipzig summit would have worked differently.

► CAI CHALLENGE

Xi is pushing ahead with the dual circulation and the Marxist political economy/ That’s not good news for the CAI negotiations, as state intervention and protectionism actively moves in the opposite direction from what the EU wants. As Xi boasts the “leading role of the state-owned economy”, EU pundits cannot rule out what implications this has on the monopolies of state-owned enterprises and the restrictions imposed on foreign companies in sectors within the Chinese economy.

At the same time, the EU could have really used Hogan in these negotiations. He was a heavyweight on trade and his expertise could have helped in concluding the CAI. Dombrovskis is by no means a bad interimaire (recall back in April and more recently in July, that he also talked to Liu He about the CAI), but a Dombrovskis-Hogan duo would have been even better. Moreover, given that the CAI is now tied to the 2025 Agenda, other cooperation programmes can be pushed back. September 14 will truly be a ‘make or break’ for the CAI.

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3. The EU and China Take Opposing Stances on Belarus

In light of President Alexander Lukashenko’s questionable re-election in Belarus, the EU did not acknowledge the elections as fair, and moved to impose sanctions, while China remains cautiously supportive of Lukashenko’s regime.

► The EU’s actions so far have been limited, likely in an attempt to avoid antagonizing Russia;

► China supports Lukashenko without committing greater diplomatic and economic resources, and announced that it opposes foreign (Western) interference into Belarus’ internal affairs;

► Lukashenko has been an ally of Beijing, trying to hedge his international standing, and Belarus’ geographic position makes it a gateway into Europe for the EU-China railway, but China sees the country as within the Russian sphere of influence.

The EU’s Minimal Response

Following the contested elections on August 9 in Belarus and in light of the ensuing protests, the EU moved to impose sanctions.

  • The EU’s foreign ministers agreed on August 14 to freeze assets and ban travel for individuals responsible for the fraudulent election or for violence against protesters.

  • By August 28, the EU27 foreign ministers agreed to target up to 20 high-level officials, though the exact number and names were not divulged. The process is ongoing.

  • In a summit on August 19, Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel stressed that Belarus is not a geopolitical issue, but a democrative one. In doing so they tried to convey that the EU will stand with the Belarussian people without the goal of antagonizing Russia.

  • The EU leaders also announced that within the €53 million financial package of state aid for Belarus €1 million will be used to support civil society and independent media and only €2 million will assist those affected by state violence.

  • Poland and Lithuania, Belarus’ EU neighbours, would have preferred to call for a new election, but Germany and France refrained from strong statements, wishing to avoid a hostile Russia. Ultimately, also HR Josep Borrell called for renewed elections under global supervision.

  • Russia’s actions are critical here, especially after Sergei Lavrov warned against any “attempt to pressure Minsk” and after Vladimir Putin promised military support for Lukashenko if the situation worsened.

  • In retaliation for the EU’s sanctions, Lukashenko threatened to block EU goods from transiting the country, which would deal a fatal blow to the EU-China railway.

China’s Stakes

Lukashenko has been a predictable and eager ally of China, as he has been trying to gain more breathing space between Russia and the EU.

  • Lukashenko’s grievances with Russia stem from Putin’s pressures to merge Belarus with Russia in exchange for economic support (e.g., sustaining access to cheap natural resources). On the other hand, the values promoted by the EU contrast with Lukashenko’s entire governance model. This pushed him to seek closer ties with China.

  • Belarus is a linchpin for the EU-China railway, with roughly 90% of related trains going through the country. Adjacently, Belarus has been positioning itself to become a key country within the BRI, trying to attract Chinese FDI and to benefit from Chinese loans.

  • The apex of Chinese investment was supposed to be the Great Stone Industrial Park (modeled on China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park), which involved $3 billion in loans from China Exim Bank and China Development Bank and was supposed to become an urban, high-tech, and manufacturing special economic zone that could house up to 50,000 inhabitants.

  • There have even been theories that China has been attempting to undercut Russian influence in Belarus. This was particularly so in December 2019, after failed negotiations between Belatus and Russia (in which Moscow suggested incorporation of Belarus in exchange for unified energy prices), when the China Development Bank granted Belarus a loan of 3.5 billion RMB (500 million USD). The loans had been, however, planned in advance.

  • Nonetheless, Chinese influence over Minsk should not be overstated. The Great Stone Park has yet to live up to expectations: only 60 companies reside there, and Belarus still has a large trade deficit with China. On top of that, Chinese FDI is skim (lower than  Polish FDI) and loans (around 20% of total Belarussian debt) are accompanied by poor planning and come with strings attached, i.e. using Chinese contractors with outdated technologies.

China’s Response to the Election

Xi Jinping congratulated Lukashenko on August 10 for re-election, an action that contrasts with the EU’s stance, but the support from China has been predominantly symbolic.

  • Xi’s congratulatory message was placed on the first page of the People’s Daily newspaper and was also found on a vast number of government websites.

  • In turn, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned the Belarus elections in two statements, on August 19 and August 26. Both times, Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said plainly that China opposes “attempts of foreign forces to trigger division and disturbances in Belarus” and supports Belarussian sovereignty.

  • Further clarity on China’s position came through articles in Global Times, which accused the West of attempting to create instability in Belarus. To China, this bears resemblance to Maidan developments in Ukraine.

  • The pieces in Global Times contain important rhetoric that show China’s perception of Belarus as being within the Russian sphere of influence. For example, they call it “Russia's last shield” and state that “It will be difficult to make the vast majority of Belarusians hate Russia in the long term, and help the West squeeze Russia. “

TAKEAWAYS

 

► A FRIEND IN NEED

China is less involved economically in Belarus than many have assumed and Chinese response to protests shows that it is similar when it comes to politics. So far, Beijing has provided limited support to Minsk and it appears it prefers to adopt a rhetoric of non-interference, leaving a free hand to Russia. Given these conditions, protests in Belarus are approached through a geopolitical lens and are thought to be primarily inspired by foreign, Western forces seeking to challenge Russia’s influence in the region. Beijing leaves the situation for Lukashenko and Putin to resolve.

Interestingly, however, while not granting Lukashenko wider support, Beijing may put pressure on him should he block the railway connection between the EU and China as a retaliatory measure to the EU. It is likely that China will simply try to protect its interests within Belarus without greater sentiment towards its ally.

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4. Czech Senate President Visits Taiwan

Two weeks after US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s tour of Central Europe, the Czech Republic’s Senate is sending a delegation on a 5-day trip to Taiwan.

► The visit is part of a wider fallout in Sino-Czech relations, which follows several years of ‘golden’ relations between Prague and Beijing;

► The Czech Senate President will be accompanied by nearly 100 Czech officials, making this the most high-level visit from Prague since the Velvet Revolution;

► The plans for such a visit were met with disapproval by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, previously, by Miloš Zeman and Andrej Babiš. However, the visit has also received support from international parliamentarians.

Mood Shift

Until 2017, the Czech Republic was one of the closest partners China had in Europe, but the sentiment has been changing.

  • Sino-Czech relations have been on a downward slope since the 2017 elections, when some policymakers in Prague concluded that closer ties with Beijing had not brought promised economic results.

  • At the same time, the pro-humanitarian, Václav Havel-inspired side of the Czech political spectrum became more vocal against China. Their voices became even more pronounced once Zdeněk Hřib, a Czech politician sympathetic towards Taiwan, became mayor of Prague in 2018.

  • The shortage in PPE equipment at the beginning of 2020 seemed to pause relations from degrading further, but in reality, Sino-Czech relations continued to devolve. (For more on the wider context, we recommend our interview with Richard Turcsanyi - Anatomy of Sino-Czech Fallout)

  • Plans for a similar visit to Taiwan were in place earlier this year, as the former leader of the Czech Senate, Jaroslav Kubera, was poised to go to Taiwan in February. However, he passed away on January 20.

Vystrčil Picks Up the Task

The new leader of the Czech Senate, Miloš Vystrčil, has maintained the plans for the visit and will be headed to Taiwan on August 30 for an official 5-day trip.

  • Vystrčil will be heading a delegation of almost 100 officials, including the mayor of Prague, Zdeněk Hřib, the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and 7 other Senators. 

  • While in Taiwan, Vystrčil is expected to have meetings with President Tsai Ing-wen, as well as with Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, Premier Su Tseng-chang, and three other ministers. He is also expected to give a speech in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s unicameral legislature.

  • Importantly, the visit is the initiative of parliamentarians, with the support of Hřib. In contrast, Czech President Miloš Zeman and Czech PM Andrej Babiš disapprove of high-level visits to Taiwan. 

Reactions

News of the visit were met with dismissal in Beijing, but received support from members of the European Parliament's Delegation for Relations with the PRC and the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC).

  • Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian called Vystrčil’s visit a “deliberate sabotage of the political basis for bilateral relations”. In a similar tone, Chinese newspaper Global Times stated that Vystrčil and his allies "sacrifice their country's national interests with regard to China for their short-term political gain”.

  • On August 20, Reinhard Bütikofer and Maria Spyraki (the chair and vice-chair of the EP’s Delegation for Relations with the PRC) wrote a message to Zhang Ming (the Chinese ambassador to the EU) where they expressed their regret towards China’s “increasingly bellicose attitude” on Prague.

  • The two referred to a leak from January in which Chinese officials made serious threats against the Czech Republic if the visit happened. The two also argued Parliamentarians are not barred from developing cultural and economic relations with Taiwan.

  • In retort, Zhang replied by saying both the Czech Republic and the EU should respect their official acknowledgement of the One-China Principle and should not interfere in China’s internal affairs.

  • On August 25, 68 Parliamentarians, 15 of which are part of IPAC, expressed their support for Vystrčil’s initiative and opposed Beijing’s pressure to annul the visit.

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TAKEAWAYS

 

► GEOPOLITICS, DOMESTIC POLITICS, IDENTITY

Many may be inclined to view Vystrčil’s visit through a geopolitical lens, after Pompeo’s eurotrip won hearts and minds at the expense of the Chinese, but the reality is more complex. 

Vystrčil’s visit shows, instead, a spectrum of factions within the Czech political sphere. On one side, Czech President Miloš Zeman has invested a large part of his political capital to bring Prague and Beijing closer together; he would like bilateral relations to bear both financial and political fruit. Meanwhile, PM Andrej Babiš lacks conviction that closer relations with Beijing will truly bring benefits but remains pragmatic about China’s important role in Czech foreign trade. At the other end of the spectrum are Vystrčil and Hřib, whose political conviction is closely tied to anti-communist dissident Václav Havel. This last faction sees Taiwan as a nation struggling to free itself from communism, just as the Czech Republic did in the 1980’s. To underscore this, Vystrčil’s announcement of the visit was followed by a reception that included a cake with the flag of Taiwan and a quote by Havel on it.

As for China, its retaliatory arsenal against the Czech Republic is limited. The economic promises Beijing provided did not really materialize, so the most it can do now is to retract these same promises. In the past, it could threaten to halt the flow of tourists to Prague (albeit the city has been struggling with overtourism) but, with the pandemic, that’s already off the table. Furthermore, China must tread carefully: the harsher its retaliation, the more it will alienate the Czechs.

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5. New Insights into Internal CCP Struggles Come to Light

New reports have emerged that support a thesis about internal disagreements within the CCP, revolving around disapprovals of Xi’s leadership style.

► As one example, the meeting at Beidaihe, which we introduced in the last briefing, is believed to have already taken place in an environment even more secretive than usual, given the potential challenges to Xi;

► Criticism coming from Cai Xia, a professor at the elite Central Party School, has further posed questions about Xi’s grip on power within the Politburo;

► Xi is supposed to end his term in 2022 at the 20th National CCP Congress, but there are increasing signals that he may not do so.

Beidaihe 2020 - Already in the Past?

The annual informal conference of the top CCP leadership at Beidaihe, which is used for political discussions and strategy, has most likely already happened.

  • The meeting is believed to have been shorter than usual, was more secretive than usual, and had less public outreach than in the past.

  • It is likely Xi chose to have a shorter, more low-key meeting. With growing tensions within the Party, he would prefer to avoid answering tough questions on China’s internal and external affairs in a formal setting.

Internal Tensions

Tensions within the Party over Xi’s political choices have been growing for some time (see short video overview by China Observer) and recent criticism from a top Party School professor only adds weight to this argument.

  • Professor Cai Xia, who had taught in the elite ideological Central Party School since 1992, was expelled from the party on August 17 for her harsh criticism against Xi’s manner of governance, stating that it placed China at odds with the world and turned the CCP into a “political zombie”.

  • In a leaked audio file, Cai denounced Xi for having “grasped the knife handle [police apparatus], the gun barrel [military]” and using the anti-corruption campaign as an instrument to purge his political opponents.

  • Underlining Cai’s concerns, Xi Jinping signalled on August 27 that he has direct control over the police and security services through a ceremony conferring the police forces a new flag.

  • Xi has allegedly been at odds with a number of key Chinese political figures, including former PRC Presidents/CCP Secretary Generals Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as well as current Premier Li Keqiang.

  • Examples of recent tensions between Xi and Li include: criticism of Li’s “street vendor/self-employment economy”, contradictions between Xi’s “dual circulation economy” and Li’s commitment to economic openness, lack of media coverage of Li’s visits to flood-impacted areas around Chongqing, and downplaying Li’s role in handling the COVID-19 crisis.

Staying Put

Despite these challenges and tensions, Xi may attempt to stay as the paramount leader even after his term is supposed to end.

  • The unwritten rule is that a Secretary General of the CCP should step down after two terms, each lasting five years. This corresponds with two terms for the President of the PRC, a post limited by the country’s constitution.

  • However, this status quo was overturned in 2018, when the National People’s Congress voted to scrap President term limits, which made all of Xi’s key titles of Secretary General of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission indefinite.

  • Technically, Xi’s should step down in 2022, with his successor being announced at the 20th National Congress of the CCP. However, Xi is expected to retain power, even if he gives up his positions.

  • Some pundits believe Xi is eager to bring back the “Chairman” title that disappeared after Mao’s death. Nonetheless, others argue that he doesn’t need the additional symbolic legitimacy, as he has already cemented power over the PLA and the security organs.

  • On top of that, in 2017 Xi managed to enshrine Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (often abbreviated to Xi Jinping Thought) into the CCP’s Constitution.

  • This means any affront against Xi is an affront against the CCP and, by extension, China itself. While Xi is alive, he will be “above all other politicians”, as Bill Bishop of Sinocism writes.

TAKEAWAYS

 

► THE CHALLENGE OF COMPLEXITY

It may be obvious for China specialists, but Cai Xia’s criticisms and the super-secret handling of Beidaihe are good reminders that it is short-sighted to paint the CCP with a broad brush. Due to its lack of transparency and its often ambiguous power dynamics, internal CCP discussions are rarely presented in the open. The recent developments once again contradict the perception of the CCP as a single-minded monolith. In reality, the over 90-million-member-strong Party is formed of various factions and the biggest challenge for paramount leaders until now has been to quell opposing factions when they became too outspoken.

Xi is investing a lot of time and effort to ensure the Party is (even if it is forced to be) single-minded, but that doesn’t mean he is always succeeding. This is worth keeping in mind when analysing China’s internal dynamics and foreign policy decisions. For example, while the Hong Kong national security law might have cost China a lot internationally, domestically the image of a strong leader enforcing order strengthens Xi Jinping’s position.

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