EU-China Briefing - 5 October 2020
YOUR WEEKLY SHOT OF EU-CHINA NEWS
BY FLAVIAN BERNEAGĂ AND GRZEGORZ STEC
1. (Open) Strategic Autonomy - EU-China Economic Angle Explained
This week, we are diving into what we knew so far about the Chinese context of Strategic Autonomy ahead of the European Council summit that happened on October 1-2.
► Ahead of the Summit, President Charles Michel explained his vision of strategic autonomy, arguing that the EU needs “more realism, and perhaps less naivety”;
► Recall that, in the context of economic relations with China, (open) strategic autonomy equates to a shift in supply chains and a gradual mitigation of dependence, albeit without desire for full decoupling;
►A report by the Rhodium Group shed further light on the topic, outlining which parts of EU-China economic exchanges are actually benign and beneficial in a first comprehensive “green-list” study to date.
Michel’s Take on Strategic Autonomy
Ahead of the European Council in which leaders discussed what sums up to boosting the European block’s strategic autonomy, President Michel took the opportunity to share his understanding of the concept.
Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, Michel said that “access to the EU’s large market [...] will no longer be sold off. From now on, we will better enforce the level playing field, in a market open to those who respect its standards. Whether they leave our Union or want to move closer to it”.
Michel further detailed his outlook at a Bruegel event on September 29, where he argued the EU’s strategic autonomy should have three goals:
Stability and security, against economic, environmental, or social hazards that could affect the EU;
Proliferation of the European standards and increasing the ‘Brussels effect’ abroad;
Promoting EU’s values, amid the current challenging international circumstances.
Referring to Paul-Henri Spaak’s famous aphorism (“There are only two types of states in Europe: small states, and small states that have not yet realized they are small”), Michel went one step further, saying “Europe is big, but it doesn’t yet know that it is big”.
Notably, he also vouched for the necessity of unanimity in Council decision-making, in spite of the stalling effect it creates. Michel argued that the unanimity requirement safeguards a robust exchange of views and allows no state to be left behind, ultimately creating greater unity. This contrasted with Ursula von der Leyen’s statements, in which she argued that unanimity within the European Council needs to be abolished in favour of qualified majority voting for the EU to work efficiently.
Quick Recap on Open Strategic Autonomy
Recall Open Strategic Autonomy - a more economy-focused concept - which is directly linked to the EU’s plans to diminish its economic dependence on supply chains from China and improve defenses of the EU’s single market. The concept gained traction due to supply chain disruptions during the early-stages of the pandemic that exposed some of the vulnerabilities.
At its core, open strategic autonomy asserts that Europe should diversify its supply chains and protect the common market from external disruptions while also upholding principles of global free trade.
As such, open strategic autonomy is not about self-sufficiency or about protectionism. Rather, it reflects the EU’s will to adapt to the changing circumstances in global trade.
Find out more about it in our podcast with MEP Iuliu Winkler, who is the Vice-Chair of the EP’s Committee on International Trade, within which he is the rapporteur on China.
Rhodium Group Study
On September 29, the Rhodium Group issued a report that sought to assess which parts of the EU’s economic relations with China are benign in nature and do not constitute economic dependencies or vulnerabilities of security nature. This report is a first comprehensive attempt to conduct this kind of assessment of the EU’s economic relations with Beijing.
The study argues that EU-China trade is largely benign - 56% of EU exports and 83% of Chinese exports get the ‘green light’ - meaning they are sustainable and do not pose a security threat to the EU. Main sectors, such as motor vehicle parts, food and drinks, luxury goods, and a good chunk of machinery and industrial goods, can be maintained without any negative effects.
On the other hand, FDI poses wider challenges. The study discovered that 46% of China’s FDI into the EU and 32% of the EU’s FDI into China cannot be categorized as ‘benign’, as they feature investments with security implications, particularly when it comes to sensitive individual data, critical infrastructure, and emerging computing technologies.
The Study concludes by offering three recommendations:
The EU has to clearly outline which parts of its economic relations with Beijing pose security risks, while also highlighting which parts are benign and constructive.
The EU has to clearly define how to assess national security in the economic context, so that foreign definitions of security are not imposed on it from the outside. Such a definition could be used as a benchmark for assessment of economic relations with China.
Europe needs to develop clear measures to mitigate the risks in economic relations with China, but apply them in a way that doesn't disrupt what is constructive.
TAKEAWAYS
► MESSAGE OF CAUTION
The study by the Rhodium Group provides very sound advice. Strategic autonomy, as Michel pointed out, does not mean closing within a shell - it equally implies a careful audit of which defences need to be enforced and which aspects of economic interconnectedness with China do not pose a risk. Recall the report on Chinese FDI in the EU done by the Court of Auditors - it, too, warned that the most pressing issue is the need to monitor the situation within the EU and using clear criteria to ensure that the EU does not “steer blindly” in its relations with China. In a similar line, Rhodium Group’s report convincingly argued the EU must establish common definitions and framework, so as to address the existing problems in its economic relations with China without throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
READ MORE
Europe’s strategic autonomy | Conversation with Charles Michel - Bruegel, Sep 28
IULIU WINKLER: Open Strategic Autonomy and EU-China Relations - Is Trade a Panacea? - EU-China Hub Podcast
Exploring a “Green List” for EU-China Economic Relations - Rhodium Group (Agatha Kratz, Matthew Mingey, and Daniel H. Rosen), Sep 29
China’s carbon pledge revives hopes of a climate game change - Financial Times (Christian Shepherd), Sep 23
EU backs China carbon neutral pledge but ‘more work to be done’ - SCMP (Stuart Lau), Sep 23
2. Special European Council Summit Reaffirms EU’s Strategic Outlook on China
On October 1 and 2, EU leaders, alongside the heads of state/government of the EU27 met for a special European Council to tackle the key internal and external issues that affect European Strategic Autonomy.
► The focus of discussions revolved around foreign, economic, and rule of law affairs, with China policy being one of the key points on the agenda;
► Notably, around the time of the Summit Chancellor Angela Merkel seemed to adopt a more assertive tone on China - praising Beijing for its climate commitments, but scorning it for “dreadful and often horrible” human rights abuses and warning China that its access to European market may become more limited if it doesn’t open up;
► The Summit served to solidify and homogenize the EU's view on China, marking an essential development in the EU’s wish to “speak with one voice”. The leaders are to continue to discuss China policy in Berlin in November.
Quick Summit Rundown
The Special European Council - originally intended to take place on September 24-25 - featured discussions on internal and external issues of strategic importance for the European block. But, the Summit also came in the context of multiple interesting dynamics.
Before the Summit, Commissioner for Transparency Věra Jourová released the Commission’s first assessment on rule of law, which pointed out that multiple states (Hungary, Poland, Malta, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia) fail to reach minimum standards on this issue.
This triggered a controversial response from Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán, who demanded her resignation, claiming that Jourová humiliated Hungary by calling it a “sick democracy” over its rule of law performance. Things calmed down once von der Leyen conveyed that Jourová enjoys the Commission’s full support.
In a speech to the Bundestag before the Summit, Angela Merkel laid out a three-point approach to EU-China relations, which welcomed Xi Jinping’s commitment to make China carbon neutral by 2060, but which also criticized lack of progress on economic reciprocity and chided Beijing for abuses to minority rights.
Notably, Macron did not attend the second day of the Summit (when China was on the agenda) for reasons related to domestic politics. He entrusted representation to Angela Merkel, thus highlighting the synergy between Paris and Berlin on China.
Streamlining the EU’s China Policy
When it comes to the Summit’s outcomes on China, it should be noted that European leaders displayed an increasingly consolidated, common position.
All EU27 leaders reaffirmed the EU-China Strategic Outlook put forward by the previous Commission and the High Representative in March 2019. The fact that all the leaders jointly endorsed this line is an important step towards speaking with one voice on China and with China.
Importantly, the leaders also stated that they expect a progress report on the implementation of the Strategic Outlook to be prepared by the Commission and the EEAS by March 2021.
The EU27 leaders also endorsed the efforts to finalize CAI by the end of the year, welcomed China’s environmental commitments, and underlined “serious concerns” about the human rights situation in China. This was consistent with the line coming from Brussels over the last few months.
The leaders also called on China to “assume greater responsibility in dealing with global challenges”, be them related to COVID-19, climate change, or aid to Africa.
Importantly, further discussions on joint China policy are on the horizon. The next informal meeting of the heads of states or governments focussed on this topic is set to take place on November 16 in Berlin. The leaders also confirmed the intention to conduct an informal meeting of EU27 with President Xi Jinping in Brussels in 2021.
Other Outcomes of the Summit
Other topics on the agenda included - among others - the issues related to Belarus, Turkey, the single market, industrial policy, and digital transition.
Leaders agreed to create restrictive measures on Belarussian authorities responsible for repression on protesters, to ”use all the instruments and options” to enforce Greek and Cypriot sovereignty rights, and also jointly condemned the poisoning of Alexey Navalny.
On the single market, the EU27 called for a return to the fully functioning common market as soon as possible, complete with lifting unjustified barriers and updating the European competition framework.
On industrial policy, they tasked the Commission to “identify strategic dependencies” in the most sensitive of sectors and to work to reduce these dependencies, by forming “new industrial alliances”.
Leaders also agreed to dedicate 20% of the Recovery and Resilience Facility to digital transition, including new digital technologies, secure network infrastructure, protection against cyber threats, as well as the employment of digital tech in education and in fighting climate crisis.
TAKEAWAYS
► ON THE RIGHT TRACK
This European Council amounted to significant progress on developing a joint EU China policy. Leaders were able to reaffirm the 2019 Strategic Outlook and even set a deadline for March 2021 for a deliverable from the Institutions. This could go a long way, as Brussels may now have more sway in adopting solutions similar to investment screening mechanisms or in monitoring Chinese FDI - after all it would be done as part of implementation of the Strategic Outlook endorsed by the Council. Even more, there will be another informal meeting of the Council on November 16 focused strictly on China policy and by then (hopefully) we will know who will be the next resident of the White House.
One other shift to observe is that in Merkel’s rhetoric on China. First of all, keep in mind her comments to the Bundestag as well as Germany’s new direction on 5G (more in news bite 4). But notably after the European Council, she said: “If there is no market access from the Chinese side for certain areas, this will of course also be reflected in the fact that market access to the European market will be narrower”. This marks the first time that the Chancellor weighed in on potentially adopting countermeasures against China in the event that CAI and market access negotiations fail - it is a signal that is likely going to be treated seriously in Beijing.
READ MORE
Special European Council, 1-2 October 2020 - European Council
Angela Merkel warns China to do more to open up or risk more restrictions on EU market access - SCMP (Stuart Lau), Oct 3
3. Germany Closer to Restricting Huawei in its Domestic 5G Networks
Handelsblatt reported that the German federal government is putting together a set of security regulations that would significantly limit Huawei’s access to the national network.
► This is very bad news for the Chinese company, which hoped its close cooperation with Deutsche Telekom could prevent its services from being restricted;
► The legislation, which is expected to be discussed by the cabinet in November, would in practice restrict Huawei’s access to “critical components” in both the core network and the access network;
► On top of security concerns in Germany, the quality and safety of Huawei equipment was also called into question last week in a report by the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), over a number of software flaws.
Fading Hope for Huawei
Recall from our July briefing that Germany represented Huawei’s most important market in Europe and the company is motivated to retain access to it.
Germany is one of the last major governments in Europe that has not yet issued a concrete 5G legislation (that are to be based on the EU’s 5G toolbox), which is connected with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s motivation to maintain positive relations with Beijing.
Huawei provided 65% of Deutsche Telekom’s (Germany’s largest operator) base stations and antennas. The two even signed an agreement in May 2019 that protected DT from any potential losses caused by disruptions of Huawei’s supply chains by American restrictions.
Change of Direction
While the expected regulation is said not to completely push Huawei out of the market, the severe restrictions it imposes would drastically reduce the proportion of Huawei tech in the German network.
Based on the Handelsblatt report, it appears that the German government desires a two-step approach: a technical test of individual components, followed by a political assessment determining whether the manufacturer is trustworthy.
The components would be checked by the Federal Office for Information Security, while the political check would be done with the help of intelligence from the Ministries of Internal Affairs, of Foreign Affairs, of Economy, and maybe even the Chancellery itself. For one manufacturer to be categorized as ‘low risk’, all of the above actors would need to grant their approval.
Keep in mind that the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Federal Intelligence Service have already publicly questioned the suitability of Chinese companies for the German network.
These new measures would essentially add several layers of red tape, which the government hopes will force the big telecom operators to reduce their orders from Huawei - all while not explicitly mentioning the Chinese company, nor assigning a blanket categorization of ‘high-risk’ on Chinese providers.
Even Merkel seems to be on board with this. When asked about a potential new German stance on 5G, she did not explicitly mention the Handelsblatt report, but emphasized the 5G Toolbox’s stipulations on high-risk vendors.
But Wait, There’s More
On top of all the developments in Germany, Huawei is now also facing complaints from the UK’s GCHQ about the security implications stemming from the poor qualityof its equipment’s software.
A report by the GCHQ, a British intelligence and security organization, shows how a vulnerability “of national significance” within the Huawei infrastructure was discovered in 2019, though it was fixed before it could be exploited.
The report further stated that, while improvements were made on the vulnerability, there was inconclusive evidence to prove the improvements were sustainable on the long term.
The GCHQ said it “does not believe that the defects identified are as a result of Chinese state interference”, but rather stem from “poor software engineering”. While these vulnerabilities were not exploited so far, the GCHQ did argue they raise further security concerns.
"If an attacker has knowledge of these vulnerabilities and sufficient access to exploit them, they may be able to affect the operation of a UK network”, said a GCHQ official.
TAKEAWAYS
► THE LAST BASTION IS ABOUT TO FALL
Huawei’s fate in Europe seems shakier by the week, with the latest revelations on German policymakers’ intentions showing just how fragile its position in the EU market has become. The other two big markets (France and Italy) had already moved towards effectively phasing out of using Huawei’s tech by actions of authorities or operators. But the company likely hoped that it would be able to retain a stake in the biggest European market - Germany.
At this point, Huawei has little to lose, so we may see dramatic attempts from it to turn the tide. For instance, Luigi De Vecchis, the president of Huawei’s Italy unit announced that he will open up his unit to external questions in order to address the political pressure (in his words, he will give up Huawei “for a vivisection”). However, if German legislators have already made their mind up, this is a train that has almost surely already departed.
READ MORE
Hohe Hürden für Huawei – „Das Verfahren kommt einem Ausschluss gleich“ - Handelsblatt (Till Hoppe, Moritz Koch), Sep 29
Germany crackdown set to exclude Huawei from 5G rollout - Financial Times (Guy Chazan), Sep 30
Huawei 'failed to improve UK security standards' - BBC (Gordon Corera), Oct 2
4. Pompeo Tours Europe Again Seeking Convergence on China
Between September 27 - October 2, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made official visits to Greece, Italy, the Vatican, and Croatia.
► The agenda revolved mostly around security and defence. This European tour followed a similar one that Pompeo took to Central and Eastern Europe, during which he promoted the US position on China among the countries in the region;
► Pompeo made a call for peace in Athens, obtained a 5G guarantee in Rome, and extracted assurances of caution regarding risks related to relations with China in Zagreb, but was refused audience with the Pope, who - officially - did not want to pull the Vatican into the US election;
► In a similar diplomatic visit, US Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment Keith Krach met with Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton to discuss the US’ “Clean Network” initiative.
The Man With the Plan
For a third time in three months, Pompeo is reaching out to European countries, following a hardening US rivalry with China.
The talks mostly focused around security and defence, i.e. peace in the Eastern Mediterranean or cybersecurity in Southern and Eastern Europe.
All these visits come in a wider context of Pompeo's speech on “Communist China and the Free World” since which the Trump administration has intensified its search for allies for its hawkish agenda on China.
Outcomes of the Visits
Pompeo’s visits were mostly successful, with a notable exception of the visit to the Vatican.
Greece
Meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Foreign Minister Dendias, Pompeo gave joint assurances that Greece and the US will employ “all appropriate means at their disposal in order to safeguard stability and security in the wider region”. The topic is particularly important to Athens given its current tensions with Turkey.
On top of that, he also visited a US naval base in Crete, met with Development Minister Georgiadis to sign a bilateral science and technology agreement, and hosted energy sector leaders for a discussion on diversifying Greece’s energy sourcing.
Italy
In Rome, Pompeo explicitly stated his China agenda and told Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte that the CCP is “not here to make sincere partnerships”, but to “exploit its presence in Italy for its own strategic purposes”.
He also met with Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, who stated that Italy acknowledges the US concerns on 5G and has already taken steps to limit critical infrastructure takeover through its ‘golden power’ legislation.
Recall that Italy has not officially put tight restrictions on Huawei, but TIM, the main Italian telecom operators, has taken the decision to stop using Huawei’s 5G equipment.
Vatican
The trip to the Holy See was meant to convince Pope Francis that the Vatican’s plans for a renewed deal with Beijing on appointing bishops are counter to the Vatican’s strategic interests - also given the recent alleged cyberattacks on the Holy See by actors connected to the Chinese government. Nonetheless, the Pope declined an audience with Pompeo, arguing he refuses to meet politicians ahead of domestic elections.
However it is notable that Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Holy See’s Secretary of State declared himself “surprised” at an article written by Mike Pompeo just weeks before his visit, in which he implied the Catholic Church would lose its “moral witness” if it pursued closer relations with Beijing.
The Vatican believed this visit was motivated by domestic politics. Namely, a photo op with the Pope could have influenced electoral outcomes in swing states with significant Catholic populations, such as Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, or Pennsylvania.
Croatia
In Dubrovnik, Pompeo met with Prime Minister Plenković, telling he wants “every country, including Croatia, to make sure they have their eyes wide open when they’re engaged in commercial activity with the Chinese Communist Party”.
Plenković stated that he is aware of the risks associated with the political and economic relations with China, and echoed the EU’s line of demanding a level playing field in economic relations with Beijing.
The 5G Toolbox and the Clean Network
Pompeo was not the only US official visiting Europe last week, as US Undersecretary Keith Krach met with Thierry Breton in Brussels on September 30.
The two discussed their cooperation in securing telecommunication infrastructure, and reaffirmed their shared values on 5G security.
Krach brought up the US’ Clean Network Initiative - a US legislative framework meant to address issues related to data privacy and security. The Clean Network is directly linked to the US’ attempts to limit the proliferation of Chinese tech.
Importantly, Breton was in general agreement with the Clean Network. He compared it to the EU’s 5G Toolbox and pleaded that the EU and the US need to pay attention to “high-risk suppliers” and fight for “free and reciprocal competition, transparency, and the rule of law” when it comes to 5G.
TAKEAWAYS
► TRANSATLANTIC PARTNER
As we covered last week, the EU explicitly stated it inclines towards Washington amid the Sino-American rivalry, and is open to the prospect of working together with the US on China. The US remains an important partner and, with or without Trump, the two actors rhyme (though they don’t necessarily always align) in interests and values. However, keep in mind that we cannot say that the EU is “picking a side” - the European block is clear about its goal of boosting own Strategic Autonomy.
One notable observation to extract from Pompeo’s trip to Greece is a comparison to the trip taken recently to Athens by Yang Jiechi. Yang also met with PM Mitsotakis, who tried to raise the issue of tensions with Turkey, but only to receive vague support for a peaceful solution from the Chinese partner. When Pompeo came, he had much more to offer and his security guarantees go a long way for the Greek government. It shows how China is simply not able to offer a similar security and not willing to offer a similar political support to European partners.
READ MORE
US, Greece call for peaceful solution in East Med during Pompeo visit, Politico (Nektaria Stamouli), Sep 28
Mike Pompeo gets Italian promise on 5G security but doesn’t convince Vatican on bishops deal with China, SCMP (Stuart Lau), Oct 1
Pompeo pledges US engagement on the Balkans, Associated Press, Oct 2
Meeting between U.S. Under Secretary of State Krach and Commissioner Breton on Secure Telecommunications Infrastructure and Digital agenda, European Commission, Sep 30
5. CCP’s Fifth Plenum on the Horizon - What To Expect From the Next Five Year Plan?
On September 28, the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee announced the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP will be held on October 26-29.
► The Fifth Plenary will be a platform for the Chinese leadership to set out the country’s economic policy for the near future;
► The Plenum in October will likely serve to make decisions on the 14th Five Year Plan, which is expected to be announced in March 2021;
► The main focus of this economic policy is likely to be the ‘Dual Circulation’ Economy, which ties to Beijing’s intention to protect the economy from US decoupling by becoming more reliant on domestic demand.
All You Need to Know about the Fifth Plenum
The announcement on the Fifth Plenum happened at the end of a Politburo conference chaired by Xi Jinping that sought to lay out China’s economic plans until 2035.
The Plenum is a congregation of the 370 members of the Central Committee, the largest decision-making bodies, which discuss policy decisions and deadlines.
The year 2035 is an important deadline for the CCP, a date by when they expect the country to achieve “socialist modernization”. As a result, the Plenum will not only put together an economic plan for 2021-2025 (the 14th Five Year Plan), but it will most likely also provide a mid-term economic strategy for 2035 objectives.
To lay the groundwork, a wide scale consultation process is organized to allow various stakeholders to offer their opinions and expectations for the next Five Year Plan.
Dual Circulation Takes Center Stage
The 14th Five Year Plan (which needs to be rubber-stamped by the authorities by March 2021) will very likely focus on the Dual Circulation economy.
What is the Five Year Plan? A policy borrowed from Moscow in the 50’s, the Five Year Plan provides a broad design for China’s strategic guidelines, by setting out economic and social development targets. This year, the Plan will spell out China’s economic strategy in the context of US decoupling, and come together with a vision for 2035.
The upcoming 14th Five Year Plan is expected to scheme out investments into research and development of new technologies, which would make China less reliant on others (particularly, the United States) in a time of increased geopolitical and market volatility.
The Bread and Butter of Dual Circulation
Propping up domestic demand is not a new principle, but the specific concept ‘Dual Circulation economy’ has been around since May and has earned endorsement by President Xi Jinping himself.
In the first two quarters of the year, China was affected both by the COVID-19 pandemic and the aftershocks of the trade war with the US, prompting the Chinese leadership to call for a faster adoption of greater reliance on domestic demand.
Dual Circulation seeks to make China’s economy more shockproof to external disturbances. As such, it would prioritize the “internal circulation”, over “external circulation” - this means generating more demand and consumption at home to compensate for losses created by the dilution of external supply chains.
However, so far we have not been given details of what Dual Circulation will be exactly, thus leaving some to question whether the emphasis on domestic demand does not spell an intention to shift China’s economic approach from massive exports to imports.
With the prospect of external partners shifting supply chains away from China, Beijing is reorienting towards attracting more international capital, as well as tapping into financial and technological markets that provide benefits. At the same time, it is seeking to boost the capacity of Chinese producers to meet domestic demand quotas that would need to supplement the lack of demand from abroad.
However, domestic demand cannot spring out of nowhere. In fact, given China’s focus on state-led development growth amid the pandemic, the consumer purchasing power of Chinese citizens is rather weak.
More systematically, the lack of a wealth distribution system has created widening gaps, leaving almost 600 million citizens on an average monthly income of 1000 yuan ($146) as assessed by Premier Li Keqiang himself. Such low wages, coupled with the absence of a safety net, provide few incentives for domestic demand to skyrocket. Changing that requires major reforms.
TAKEAWAYS
► GET READY FOR A BIG ONE
The upcoming Five Year Plan is one that you’ll need to keep an eye on, as it will define China’s position amid a politically charged global economy. It is bound to affect relations with the EU, be them on trade, internet governance, or climate change.
But all the talk in Beijing about Dual Circulation clearly suggests that a general trajectory has already been chosen - domestic demand will likely be prioritized, with “external circulation” playing a secondary role - allowing China to be more selective on that front. Still, Chinese experts have been arguing that Dual Circulation economy is not necessarily bad for external actors. According to them, more demand could be the prerequisite for a more open market, but so far, this is pure speculation - one that is not held up by the prioritized role offered to SOEs during the pandemic.
On top of trade and investment, the next Five Year Plan will also signal how serious China is about peaking its carbon emissions by 2030, what is the more concrete plan for achieve “socialist modernization” b’ by 2035, as well as what we can expect from the National Medium- to Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development. Get ready - there’s a lot coming our way.
READ MORE
Xi Jinping presided over the Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee to discuss the document to be submitted to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee for deliberation - Chinese Government, Sep 28 (link in Chinese)
Upcoming 14th Five-Year Plan policy package attracts wide attention - Global Times (Liu Xin), Aug 8
Dual Circulation and China’s New Hedged Integration Strategy - CSIS (Jude Blanchette), Aug 24